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ABSTRACT

BEING BETTER AT DOING GOOD: ORGANIZATIONAL ENGAGEMENT AND FOREIGN
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN DPR (NORTH) KOREA

By
Rajarshi Sen
December 2014
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Charles Hanna
Foreign organizations work in DPR Korea under multiple external and internal pressures, and
these organizations try to respond to their working environment in their own ways. However, it
is important that these foreign organizations are able to work effectively, in order for
engagement with DPRK to be meaningful. In this research, utilizing the case study method, I
explore the questions: How can foreign organizations effectively work in DPR Korea? What can
they do to more easily achieve their outputs and outcomes? What are the dynamics of the mutual
embeddedness process as foreign organizations become immersed in the context of DPRK? I
find that organizations in their efforts to respond to the environment in DPRK end up
compromising their effectiveness in avoidable ways. I explore what works and what doesn’t for
organizational management in DPRK and make some recommendations.
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Introduction
DPR Korea (North Korea/ DPRK) has one of the most difficult in-country operating
conditions for foreign organizations and managers. Scholars have noted that economic
engagement with DPRK has been “used for cross-purposes and that this…is unwittingly helping
North Korea achieve aims…” which are unintended (Smith 2005: 22). However, at the same
time, there is significant support for engagement with DPR Korea (Asia Society and University
of California 2009). Influential sections in many countries such as China, Russia and even the
Republic of Korea (South Korea/ROK) feel that it is through constructive economic engagement
that DPRK may change from within into a country that can ensure the welfare of all of its
people, and hence reduce the tension in the Korean peninsula. But how do we ensure the
effectiveness of economic engagement with DPRK?
To answer that question, I study the record of engagement of foreign organizations working in
DPRK. I find that there is scope for massive inconsistency between what foreign organizations in
DPRK expect to happen (such as, behaviors they expect from their local employees/DPRK
nationals), based on how these organizations manage their operations, and how the employees
perceive these organizations, based on what they expect of such organizations. Foreign
organizations’ understanding of existing social drivers and what they can achieve in such an
environment is under-studied, especially in a secretive and closed economic system like DPR
Korea.
The specific questions that this research explores are: How can foreign organizations
effectively work in DPR Korea? What can they do to more easily achieve their outputs and
outcomes? To what extent do foreign organizations change due to working in DPR Korea and, in
1

turn, to what extent do DPRK actors change due to working with foreign organizations; i.e., what
are the dynamics of the mutual embeddedness process? These are important questions not only
for DPRK but for many other contexts, such as post-socialist transition countries.
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) working in emerging markets worry about the ‘fit’ of their
organizations to the local context. ‘A recent Accenture survey shows that 95 percent of senior
executives say that they doubt their companies have the right operating model to support their
international strategy’ (Girod, Bellin and Thomas 2009: 3). Depending on the alignment of
interests between headquarters and the country of operation, the management responses to the
problem of local intransigence may range from the need for minor adaptations to overcoming
significant hurdles.
For instance, organizations the world over employ various incentives that are designed to
retain, motivate and promote their staff. In DPRK, the conditions like restricting interaction
between national and foreign workers are such that those incentives lose their edge. To make
things worse, there is the overhang of geopolitical crisis that periodically negatively impact
operations of organizations in DPRK. It is therefore in the interests of those working and
investing in DPRK, and in the interest of effectiveness of official development assistance, to
better understand the various ways of embeddedness and spillovers of foreign organization
working in that country.
Moreover, much of the literature on economic and organization management in socialistcommunist contexts tend to be concentrated on European post-socialist transition countries. This
study contributes to comparable literature focusing on the Asian context.
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Enhancing Organizational Effectiveness in DPRK: Clutching at Straws?
Enhancing the effectiveness of foreign organizations working in DPRK may sound like
wishful thinking. Organizational effectiveness at its simplest is about improving organizational
performance externally and internally (Richard et al. 2009). This should be determined through
multiple criteria, including productivity, growth, turnover, stability, collaboration and human
resource development (Scott 1992: 343).
As the abovementioned criteria inter alia determine the embeddedness of an organizational in
its context, we examine the process of embedding of foreign organizations working in DPRK.
The concept of organizational embeddedness, introduced by Polyani (1944) and expanded by
Granovetter (1985) and others is useful for this research as it allows a study of the complexity
within which organizations find themselves. Another usefulness of the embeddedness concept is
its dual nature: Embeddedness constrains organizations’ effectiveness by tying them down in
webs of social, political, cultural factors that act as friction against efficient management;
embeddedness can also open up opportunities for organizations through, for example, improved
network resources, greater trust and lower transactions costs.
Foreign organizations adjust their corporate interests in relation to local conditions existing in
host countries. Therefore, the economic, social, cultural, and institutional conditions of host
countries are important considerations for organizational embedding processes; particularly,
social, micro-level interaction between expat managers of foreign organizations and local actors
(Kahancová 2008).
In DPRK, where there is tight control on every facet of life, the drivers and barriers to
embeddedness, the relevant variables, should be identifiable. Foreign organizations operate here
3

based on (i) a broader agreement with local authorities as to their mandate; and (ii) specific
permissions for each consequent activity that implementing the broad agreement entails.
Basically, the ‘official line’ is supposed to be followed in every aspect of economic and social
exchange. The official line basically prescribes a range of activities and functions that are preapproved. Any deviation, therefore, stands out.
Accordingly, I study the outcomes of certain activities and attendant friction/transaction costs
of those activities under examination, which at different points in their life in DPRK the foreign
organizations engage in. Further, the embedding process in DPRK does not generate increasing
returns; e.g., giving more incentives to workers does not necessarily engender proportionally
increasing levels of trust in them towards management. This is because the system in DPRK is
premised on minimizing interaction, reciprocity and dependence between locals and foreigners.
For example, DPRK nationals working in foreign organizations are mandatorily removed after
relatively short periods of time. Also, there is no scope for contact between former international
and national colleagues. Many such micro-level restrictions are in place, designed to effectively
bring about a sort of mutual disembeddedness, which act as barriers to positive mutual
embeddedness.
Thus, to understand how embedding occurs I follow a three-pronged approach:


Elicit an understanding of interactions and dynamics from available literature on
foreign management practices in DPRK and in the post socialist transition context.



Empirically explore micro-level management practices of foreign organizations
working in DPRK, and the response of relevant local actors/counterparts.
4



Apply theoretical logic to the empirical information and to the findings from literature,
to determine the variables (i.e., the drivers and barriers) to the mutual embedding
process between the foreign organizations operating in DPRK and their local
counterparts.

The possible variables of embeddedness/disembeddedness in day-to-day management
practices that this research focuses on include: the human resource management practices of
international agencies and firms working in DPRK (e.g., what kinds of incentives improves
which types of performance of workers?); motivations and ideologies of salient actors (e.g., what
kinds of incentives are requested by workers for which kinds of work); and the consequent
negotiation/bargaining dynamics between expat managers and their DPRK counterparts.
As this research is essentially exploratory in nature, it utilizes a mix of suitable qualitative
research tools, including literature review, participant and non-participant observations, and
unstructured interviews. Qualitative methods are appropriate for case studies, and that is the
method I adopt in this research for studying the selected cases of the handful of foreign
organizations working in DPRK. The aim of this research is not to test hypotheses, as the areas
under study in the context of DPRK are still underexplored and hence data and theories will not
be readily available. Instead, this research aims to identify salient variables (i.e., drivers and
barriers to mutual embeddedness and disembeddedness), study the various conditions of cause
and effect of such variables, and generate hypotheses. Qualitative research is also suitable for
this kind work to trace the lines of causation.

5

The consultation includes sources available in the public domain (such as aid agency reports)
and, utilizing my current vantage point as resident in DPRK, appropriate observations of salient
people and dynamics relevant to organizations in-country.

Limitations
All limitations of case study methods apply.
Limitations of convenience sample apply: i.e., low generalizability and external validity.
However, through an extensive survey of the theoretical and case study literature (aid agency
documents) and close observation of aid agency practices, we expect to compensate for sample
limitations.
Limitations of studying embeddedness: One general vexing question in organizational
embeddedness research is how to attribute embeddedness/disembeddedness. Organization
research scholars have cautioned, “Not everything is ‘embeddedness’” (Dacin et al. 1999: 321).
In the case of DPRK, this problem is somewhat mitigated by the fact that market forces are
greatly attenuated, particularly at the meso-level economic sectors which most foreign
organizations occupy and work in. In addition, it is the author’s experience in DPRK that
reciprocal decisions/actions often occur, to an extent, in a tit-for-tat manner, i.e., the organization
takes one step and DPRK counterparts take another corresponding step in relatively quick
succession. Such responses make the question of attribution somewhat transparent.
Another way to address the attribution question is to study processes that unfold at the
boundaries of the official sphere, in less formal contexts, where relevant actors and actions can
6

be relatively unstructured and unencumbered. Accordingly, this research will focus on “margins
and overlaps …pay close attention to processes that unfold at the peripheries, interstices, and
overlaps of institutional fields… In these social locations, authority structures may be attenuated,
roles and boundaries are often blurred or ambiguous, and participants are exposed to multiple
models or logics, creating opportunities and resources for actors to experiment with new,
multiple, or hybrid forms” (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006: 218-219).
Furthermore, in keeping with the best recommendations in embeddedness research methods,
this research studies the rich empirical context in which organizations work in DPRK. This study
looks at the various repetitive actions and processes that foreign organizations in DPRK do over
time, and the corresponding responses to and outcomes of such actions and processes.
Limitations of studying effectiveness: this research studies mostly public organizations in
non-market conditions. This can be a limitation as effectiveness of an organization functioning in
properly functioning markets can be more easily measured by standard metrics such as income,
profits and/or surveys of customer satisfaction. Measuring effectiveness of the work of public
organizations, operating in non-market conditions, is unfortunately not so straightforward.
Controls over these organizations emphasize control over process rather than over outcome, and
it is harder to measure the effectiveness of processes (Scott 1992). However, some have argued
that markets, like all structures, are socially constructed and vary over time and space, so that
conceptions of efficiency or effectiveness also vary (Fligstein 1993).

7

Literature review
The field of economic and organization management in socialist-communist countries is
informed by many studies on post-socialist transition and comparatively fewer studies (at least
the recent ones that are in English) on the management of ‘classical’ socialist organizations, not
in transition. The scarcity of the latter type of studies is due to information control and
restrictions on scholarship in ‘classical’ socialist-communist countries and disinterest of
contemporary scholars on classical socialism (Frank and Burghart 2010). As to the former body
of work—on post socialist transition—this is often colored by Western and neoclassical
economic precepts. (There is also an interesting body of literature on the lessons to be learned
from socialist transition, mostly by World Bank economists and others from similar background,
of which the two notable scholars are Joe Stiglitz; and Justin Lin, who have greatly illuminated
China’s transition. However, these works deal with macro level issues such as initial conditions
and path dependencies and not so much with the meso and micro level issues that is the remit of
this research.) At any rate, much of this abovementioned literature is on European socialistcommunist systems. The applicability of this Eurocentric knowledge is limited to DPR Korea as
European socialism-communism and the Asian variety, particularly, DPRK’s system, differ in
important ways. There is nevertheless some comparable literature on DPR Korea and some
committed scholars. Much of the Korean scholarship on this subject usually focuses on
international relations, unification or regime collapse. A general issue, however, with this
growing body of work is the lack of the respective researchers’ direct and sustained physical
access inside the country. Hence, these scholars are limited in their direct observation of internal
workings of organizations and human dynamics in situ in DPRK.
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Perhaps the first serious study of pre-reform, ‘classical’ socialist economy is by the celebrated
Hungarian economist, János Kornai (1928- ). Kornai’s analyses were based on real world
observations of socialism, his approach systems-wide, and his research method inductive rather
than deductive. Kornai examined economic organization of centrally planned economies and
identified several systemic failures of the centrally planned economy. In one of his most
influential books, Economics of Shortage (Kornai 1980), Kornai argued that the chronic
shortages seen throughout Eastern Europe during the years of socialist planning were not the
consequences of planners’ errors or the wrong prices, but rather systemic flaws. Kornai argued
that the command economy based on the control by a Marxist-Leninist communist party leads to
a predominance of bureaucratic administration of state firms, through centralized planning and
management, and the use of administrative pricing to eliminate the effects of the market. This
leads to individual responses to the incentives of this system, ultimately causing the ‘shortage
economy’. This shortage ‘mentality’ has broader impact on the level of institutions also, that
becomes evident in managerial practices, as noted in the following paragraph, with relevance to
the variables being studied in this research -- human resource management practices; motivations
of relevant actors; ideologies; and negotiation dynamics.
Comparative management studies identify and explain similarities and differences among
business strategies, management systems and social behavior in different work contexts (e.g.,
geographic areas, cultures or industries). Historically, the study of comparative management
assumed salience in the context of post-socialist transition, as the recognition dawned ‘that postsocialism has proven to be more complex, convoluted and diverse than was first thought by the
transition economists’ (Clark and Geppert 2006: 3). It became clear in post socialist institution
building that the influence of foreign actors was actively constrained by local actors in a variety
9

of everyday micro-social interactions. The literature on the study of small and medium enterprise
management in post-socialist transition draws from the rich empirical evidence of eastern
European firms, a region which became “a tremendously interesting research laboratory for
scholars interested in organizational and management issues” (Michailova and Liutho 2001).
The relevant discernible strands of investigation by various scholars in this research include
(Dragomirescu 2012):


Institutional fragility – institutional fragility results from socialist organizations’
vulnerability to the chaos and randomness of post-socialist conditions and from their
attempts to imperfectly adjust to such conditions of high uncertainty.



Adjustment and formation of new managerial practices – this strand reveals that in post
socialist enterprises, new management practices are developed by the managers
themselves, through reflection and actual experimentation, rather than through theory and
foreign influence only.



Human Resource Management (HRM) – HRM is an important strand in post-socialist
organization management, as socialist countries had precious few capital intensive
resources but ready access to human resources. In DPRK organizations, too, HR
management is a contested area between expat managers and extra mural organizational
influences. It has been seen that post-socialist evolution of HRM practices is often not an
imitation of purely Western models. Rather, there is the interweaving of various
influences: drivers of path dependence -- i.e., national culture; domestic managerial
culture and practices; and drivers of change—i.e., international business ideologies; and
new lessons from engagement with the new market and technological opportunities.
10

The relevant and recent literature specifically on DPRK is by a handful of scholars with long
commitments to Korean studies. Hazel Smith is a scholar who was also a practitioner, having
worked with UN and humanitarian agencies in DPRK. In Hungry for Peace (Smith 2005), she
deals with famine in the 1990s in DPRK. She explains that the famine and the humanitarian
response have subtly transformed DPRK's economy, society, and political thinking, as the
country accepted some international norms and allowed markets to function. Rüdiger Frank and
Sabine Burghart among others have done interesting work on socialist transformation in DPRK.
Their approach is to study the history and transition of socialist institutions, and illuminate the
‘stickiness’ of the institutions in the context of change (Frank 2010: 54). In a 2006 (54) paper,
Frank notes:
Though not making headlines in the Western press, the societal relations in North
Korea have changed dramatically. It is virtually impossible to undo what the
monetization of the economy has done to individual’s outlook on their own life and
their place in society. In addition to loyalty to the state, there now exists an
alternative way of advancing. The politically enforced uniformity of living
conditions that applied to most North Koreans has been rapidly replaced by social
stratification according to material wealth on a large scale. In a monetized economy,
political power is closely related to economic power. Unless the top leadership
decides to start a massive purge and to expropriate the new rich - a step that would
be politically risky and therefore must be considered unlikely - these winners could
become the nucleus of a middle class that would exhibit the same characteristic as
elsewhere: a strong distaste for extremes.

11

Noland (2014) in a recent paper examines labor standards and employment practices in
Kaesong special economic zone in DPRK, where Republic of Korea (South Korean) firms
operate. This paper examines whether ROK firms’ employment practices are likely to encourage
DPRK’s transition. Utilizing survey data, Noland shows that the DPRK government has
successfully circumscribed exposure of its citizens who are the workers in these ROK firms to
market-oriented economic practices. Noland finds no evidence of the sort of broader spillovers
that proponents of engagement sometimes assert. The paper then also explores the possibility of
using voluntary labor codes to promote transformation.
The work of the above scholars, cumulatively, has significant breadth, but there is a
paucity of in situ studies. The source material for most of these works is second hand—either
interviews of defectors, mirror statistics or other proxies. There is a troublesome limitation of
primary and reliable information on DPRK, and hence there is a speculative quality pervading
much of the literature. This problem is so widespread that the authoritative macroeconomic
modeling paper on DPRK by Noland et al (1999) is titled: “Rigorous Speculation.” In this paper,
Noland and others contend that the economic returns to DPRK from systemic reform will be
much higher than strategies narrowly aimed at agriculture or sectoral recovery.

The Institutional Situation in DPRK
Formally, DPRK has an overarching socialist, command-type political economy, which is
impacted by ‘dramatic internal and external pressures’ (Ducruet 2008: 17). The state owns and
controls all economic units, a small leadership group exerts monopoly power, a strong political
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ideology is pervasive, and the Party or military bureaucracy dominates all institutions of
governance (Frank and Burghart 2010).
In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the communist states of the Eastern Bloc, the
DPRK lost its privileged access to capital goods, petroleum, spare parts, and machinery. Import
prices of its vital inputs rose dramatically, driving an equally dramatic reduction in industrial
production and export earnings. The DPRK’s economy started to shrink in 1990, and over the
four-year period from 1990 to 1993, it declined an average of four percent a year. In the mid–
1990s the DPRK then endured a series of natural disasters. These events eroded the agricultural
base of the country, and the economy continued to decline at about three percent a year from
1994–1998, its GNP decreasing by roughly 35 percent from $23.2 billion USD in 1990 to $12.6
billion USD in 1998. Per capita GNP fell by 50 percent from $1,146 USD to $573 USD in the
same period, and estimate of GDP for the same period dropped by 50 percent from 1992 to 1998
(UN 2008).
In 1995, the DPRK made a request for humanitarian assistance to the international
community. In addition to multilateral aid, DPRK receives bilateral aid from individual
countries, particularly China and, formerly, the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
The United Nations agencies, embassies, and international NGOs (INGOs) constitute a
relatively sizeable presence of foreign organizations in DPRK.

United Nations Country Team
The UN Country Team (UNCT) in DPRK has six resident agencies. The UNCT is made
up of the top leadership of these six agencies, and its job is inter-agency coordination to ensure
13

the overall development approach is coherent, cohesive, non-duplicative and supports the
development agenda of the Government (UN DPRK 2014).
The United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF) is the planning framework for the
programmes and operational activities of the United Nations system in the DPRK, in effect
normally for a fixed period, currently for four years, ending in 2015. The overall objective of the
UNSF is to support the Government to improve the quality of life of the people, ensure
sustainable development and achieve progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The
various United Nations agencies have different comparative advantages. At a strategic level, the
UNSF tries to assign areas of activity/responsibility for the agencies based on their respective
mandates and advantages, and to ensure that agencies achieve synergies by working together.
There are four priority areas: Social Development; Partnerships for Knowledge and
Development Management; Nutrition; and, Climate Change and the Environment, all of which
are interlinked. Coordination among resident UN agencies on all common issues relating to the
implementation of the UNSF is through the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator (UN DPRK
2014).

Non-UN actors in DPRK
Resident non-UN actors in the humanitarian/development space in DPRK are six
European INGOs (known in DPRK as European Union Programme Support units or EUPS, with
numerical suffixes, as EUPS1, EUPS2,…), Red Cross organizations (IFRC and ICRC) and three
bilateral/government missions (French, Italian and Swiss) (UN DPRK 2014). It is noteworthy
that these well-known INGOs cannot operate in DPRK under their own names.

14

In addition, there are 24 embassies in Pyongyang. Then, there are resident commercial/
joint venture organizations: such as a Polish shipping organization; a Swedish-Korean joint
venture mining and a Swedish-Korean JV pharmaceutical organization; many Chinese joint
ventures, mostly in trading; Czech breweries; Philipino cigarettes manufacturers; and, of course,
possibly the largest joint venture in DPRK, the Egyptian-DPRK Koryolink telecommunication
company. Expat managers and foreign personnel of these commercial organizations mostly
reside in and around the Munsudong diplomatic area in Pyongyang, with all the other diplomats,
UN and aid workers.

15

DPRK, like China and other socialist countries, has begun experimenting in enclave
capitalism, and has set up Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in far flung areas of the country. The
Rason Special Economic Zone was established in the far northeast of the country in 1991. The
two Koreas have established two joint economic zones, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)
and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region (where operations are now suspended). DPRK’s SEZs
have attracted investment and foreign currency, without spurring greater/general economic
growth in the rest of the country through the establishment of linkages or through “demonstration
effect” leading to more effective economic activities. Recent developments indicate that the
government is increasingly promoting SEZs. DPRK recently announced that new SEZs would be
established in each province of the country. The expat managers and staff of the SEZs are
restricted to living within the SEZs. How do the various agencies and organizations differ in
terms of motivations, ideology, and negotiation styles—i.e., the relevant variables being studies
in this research? In the discussion below, we examine the general varieties of organizing and
managing in socialist systems, and within that discussion will situate our DPRK case study.

[Details of the agencies in Appendix]

DPRK’s Coordinating Agencies
DPRK government has coordinating bodies for the foreign agencies working in the
country; these agencies are generally part of some of the ministries, like the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The coordinating bodies are: KECCA (the Korean Europe Cooperation Coordination
Agency) for INGOs and NCC (the National Coordinating Agency) for UN Agencies.
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For foreign commercial organizations operating the Special Economic Zones, the government
coordinating agencies are the State Economic Development Commission (SEDC) and the Korea
Economic Development Association (KEDA). These oversee the development and promotion of
DPRK SEZs. The Kaesong Industrial Complex has a dedicated coordinating body, the Kaesong
Industrial District Management Committee (KIDMAC). There are recent reports that the
Ministry of External Economic Affairs (formerly the Ministry of Foreign Trade) has been
reorganized in June 2014 to subsume DPRK’s Joint Venture and Investment Commission
(JVIC), SEDC and possibly all other separate agencies, and thus all matters related to foreign
economic enterprises has been streamlined into a single body now (IFES 2014).
These coordinating agencies’ explicit role is to collaborate and coordinate the working of
respective foreign organizations; they also exert parallel control on DPRK staff working in
foreign organizations.
In each office, particularly for the embassies, INGOs and UN agencies, there are one or two
national colleagues who are responsible for keeping the other national colleagues in that unit in
line. Hence, it is often the case that there are intersecting parallel lines of management, explicit,
and implicit, in any foreign organization in DPRK.
Thus, foreign managers face many challenges in managing organizations in DPRK. Yet, there
is growing evidence of interdependent interaction between DPRK entities and foreign
organizations working in DPRK. There are reports, for example, that minimum operating
conditions of humanitarian agencies were gradually improving1. Private commercial firms were
employing innovative methods to reward and incentivize DPRK workers, such as through
1

Aid agencies in DPRK regularly put out various reports of their cooperation on the ground and
scanning any of those can lead one to easily conclude that working environment is tentatively
improving.
17

chocolate pies at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (which is a longstanding example of interKorean cooperation, and most recently affected in the wake of the 2013 Korean crisis2) (Kim
2012).

Organizations and Management in Socialist Systems
There is not much existing literature in the public domain on actual organizational level
management and human resource practices prevalent in DPRK. This is to a large extent due to
the lack of access of researchers to organizations in DPRK. There are (1) only a handful of case
studies of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)—the joint DPRK-ROK Special Economic
Zone (SEZ)—which is perhaps the only industrial area where organization researchers have
access. Then, there are some organizational audit-type reports (mostly of the United Nations’
organizations) available in the public domain. And, my own empirical observations based on
three years of living and working (as an international development consultant) in DPRK. Hence,
this is the body of knowledge from which I draw inferences for this research.
As a starting point, for general purposes/ macro-perspective, it may be valid to assume that
DPRK having a socialistic and command economy type, there should be broad similarities with
systems and practices prevalent in such socialist countries elsewhere. Socialist management
systems have been noted for the following essential characteristics (Kozminski 1993: 8-9):
o The managers serve political priorities directly as opposed to maximization of
economic surplus
2

The latest crisis in 2013 included an escalation of tensions between North and South Korea
(Republic of Korea, ROK), the United States, and Japan. The trigger was the North's launch of
its Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 Unit 2 satellite on December 12, 2012, and its nuclear test on February
12, 2013.
18

o Socialist enterprises bear the burden of providing for social needs of employees, in
addition to salaries
o Socialist managers execute plan targets decided at level of central planning
o Socialist enterprises practice input optimization (i.e., how to produce more from
relatively fixed inputs), leading to poor quality of products.
Moreover, in socialist State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), managers do not see their roles
as entrepreneurs, interested in expanding future incomes for the organization, but rather
primarily as custodians on behalf of the state of past investments and resources. Thus, in socialist
economies, SOE managers adopt a bookkeeping management style; as profits/surplus if any is
generally turned over to state or used per directions from the state (Boisot 1996: 923).
Socialist socio-economic systems usually operate as rigidly hierarchical and rule-bound,
and are marked by several important disconnections. Business organizations are intersected with
multiple lines of authority (this, for instance, is evident in the foreign organizations working in
DPRK, e.g., as noted in the DPRK Coordinating Agencies section above); the management style
in use is a combination of participation, ideological propaganda, and coercion. The enterprises
are deeply dependent on the state for structural and political-ideological reasons; such
dependence leads to disconnect of the actions of economic units from their financial
consequences (e.g., soft budget constraints3). Managers of socialist enterprises must demonstrate
submission to the official ideology, and hence must conspicuously display their obedience; such
conformity may even lead to the disconnect between the formal organizational system from
actual organizational practices (Tsoukas 1994: 23).
3

This phrase, credited to the Hungarian economist János Kornai, is the description of an institutional practice in
centrally planned, socialist economies in which production units form expectations of always being bailed out by
central authorities and not be held accountable for performance (Wikipedia).

19

As for organizational culture—i.e., the system of values and meanings practiced in and
promoted by a specific organization and which it uses to motivate its employees—for capitalist
firms it is generally locally-defined (i.e., related to the firm’s immediate social environment),
loose and implicit. Organization culture of firms in socialist economies on the other hand is
centrally-ordained; employee motivation in socialist firms is therefore traced to state/external
sources and is much more heavily imposed than in capitalist firms. Of course, the specifics of
how organizational cultures were practiced differed from country to country. For instance,
organizational culture in the former Soviet Union involved obtrusive party and government
propaganda, press campaigns, and party control into employee inducements and motivations; in
other words, staying in the good books of the party leaders, who may or may not have the best
economic interests of the organization at heart, would be a sine qua non for any employee’s
career (Tsoukas 1994: 33).
In current day DPRK, an idea of organization culture can be had from a reading of the
precepts of economic management being implemented in the country, the so-called Economic
Management in Our Style policy. According to this policy, DPRK is a socialist society where:
…the means of production are socially owned and where the economy develops
according to the guiding plans of the country …. With relation to means of production,
socialist ownership is the foundation of a socialist economy, and a socialist economy is
developed through collective labor…. Adhering to socialist principles in an economic
enterprise means to support and hold fast to socialist ownership and to thoroughly
realize the principles of collectivism. ….. In terms of economic leadership and
management, we must adhere to and support socialist ownership, put national and
societal gains above all else while also securing as much profit as possible for
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producers. …. The entire process of production and management must become one
which fosters the spirit of collectivism in workers and laborers and which elevates the
public’s willpower and creativity so that they may fulfill their roles and feel ownership
responsibility. …. Economic guidance and management must coincide with objective
economic laws and scientific logic in order to guarantee the highest amount of real
economic profit. …. Objective economic laws affect a socialist economy, and the
process of satisfying those demands is equal to ‘economic construction’ or an
‘economic development process’. …. In order to guarantee real economic profits,
economic laws and related economic spaces must be put to use effectively. Such
economic laws include the law of value, the law of distribution through labor, and the
law of planned, balanced development of the people’s economy through economic
leadership, management, production and economic activities. …. In terms of economic
guidance and company management, efforts first must be made to advance scientific
technology, and all processes and factors relating to production and management must
be made scientific. All businesses should actively pursue research and development in
new technology and progress towards becoming a company where scientific technology
and production are integrated – a technology-intensive business. (IFES 2014b)
In November 2002, the agreement between the two Koreas on the Kaesong Industrial
Complex allowed, for the first time, large volumes of investments from ROK firms in industrial
units that would employ DPRK labor under ROK management. KIC had attractive benefits that
created potential competitive advantages for southern small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to
locate in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The KIC is located only 60 km from Seoul, and is also
close to the Incheon Free Enterprise Zone (IFEZ), the main logistics hub of ROK.
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Case studies of the Kaesong Industrial Complex note that southern managers have stated
that they are impressed with the intensity with which northern workers take their jobs. In return,
due to the relative improvement of working conditions for workers in KIC under ROK
management standards, DPRK worker health and appearance, anecdotally, showed some
improvement. There are also preliminary signs of effectiveness of knowledge management, as
there were gradual relaxation of controls on social interaction between management and
workers (emphasis mine). Preliminary findings are that, cumulatively, these measures have led to
a higher level of skill assimilation, and thus a greater degree of productivity improvement
(Gower 2011).

Organizational Change in Socialist Systems
The immediate post socialist transition period was an exceedingly fraught environment,
exerting significant pressures on organizations to transform rapidly. Such an environment has
led to counter-intuitive outcomes in socialist organizations. Organization managers, caught
between the pressures to maintain continuity and the pressures of change induced by external,
transformative forces have often resorted reflexively to the comfort and certainty of known
routines.
Post socialist managers have, thus, continued to see through old lenses, reproduce old
practices, and in this way have somehow coped at a time of great flux and achieved some degree
of organizational continuity. However, many similar organizations and their managers have also
opted for a significant break from old routines and embraced organizational change to cope with
the fast changing environment (Clark & Soulsby 1998).
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It seems that what has happened in the complex reality in post socialist contexts is that
during the times of transition managers have rationalized their decisions in extreme conditions of
incomplete and conflicting information, utilizing rough and ready justifications, rather than
established dogma. It has been a process of learning by doing for the post socialist managers.
This has led to several typical outcomes:

(i)

During early periods of transition, organizations have resisted change and tried
to cling to some degree of continuity.

(ii)

During the mid-phase of transition, post socialist organizations have begun to
try to copy management practices of foreign organizations.

(iii)

During the late stages of transition, organizations have learned to combine
elements of continuity and elements of change, which has in effect resulted in
restructuring of post socialist organizations, with some residual elements of the
old organization (Clark & Soulsby 2007).

Implications of Socialist Socio-economic Systems for Organizational
Management
Scholars have described the management of organizations in socialist systems as
‘politically induced isomorphism’ (Tsoukas 1994: 33-4), in which socialist organization
managers enforce conformance on their organizations to the party line as an attempt to enhance
their and their organizations’ legitimacy. In return, the state allocates resources for these
organizations’ functioning and propagation.
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However, dependence on the state for precious resources and management approach to
enforce submission to political priorities leaves the question of the organization’s response to
real economic forces uncertain. Tsoukas, for example, writes (1994: 36):
Thus, a socialist economic system causes two fundamental dissociations: vertically, the
dissociation of the formal organizational structure and culture from actual practices and
behaviors and, horizontally, the dissociation of the actions of an economic unit from
their consequences. Both these disjunctions generate vicious circles: the more actual
behavior is different from that intended, the more central authorities respond with more
indicators, regulations and restrictions which, in turn, produce more of the initial nonconforming behavior. Similarly, the softer the budget constraints, the greater the appeal
of economic units to the usually receptive state, to rid them of their difficulties.
Some interesting insights may be drawn from the discussion in the above sections on
organization, management and change in socialist systems, relevant to the variable we are
studying in this research—HR practices; employee motivations; ideologies; and negotiation
dynamics. It appears that in stable circumstances, as socialist organizations become increasingly
dependent on the state, the dependence becomes somewhat habit forming for the managers. HR
practices, motivations, ideologies and negotiation dynamics must therefore be adjusted to justify
dependency. This implies deeper path dependency and organizational inertia. In times of change,
it is difficult to shake off those dependencies and inertia, at least in the initial phases of
transition. It is only during the later phase of transition, after much hard learning, that post
socialist organizations and managers inculcated in the values and practices of socialist systems
are able to adjust to some form of hybrid management combining old forms and new pressures.
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Case Study
With the above theoretical discussion of socialist organizations and management
practices in perspective, let us now turn to some actual instances and management practices in
DPRK. Specifically, among foreign organizations working in DPRK, the example of one agency
stands out (DISCLAIMER: There are various real and high risks to researchers, organizations
and persons for any case study involving DPRK. Accordingly, for reasons of anonymity and
confidentiality, the actual agency that is the subject of this research will not be named here but
referred to only as United Nations Agency (UNA). To maintain anonymity and confidentiality, I
may have changed indentifying details. To avoid the risk of deductive disclosure, certain
information sources may be available only upon request and clarification of the intent and
purpose of the request. Any resemblance to any actual persons, living or dead, or actual
organization or events is purely coincidental. The findings, interpretations and conclusions
expressed in this paper are mine only and do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of the
United Nations, or any of its funds, programmes or specialized agencies.).
UNA is probably the only foreign agency working in DPRK which has by agreement
with the host government tried to implement management and human resource principles of
international standard. Therefore, this agency is an interesting case to study the effects of human
resource practices on organizational effectiveness within the contextual limitations of DPRK.

UNA Programs in the DPRK
UNA is one of the oldest foreign aid agencies working for the last three to four decades
in DPRK in areas of humanitarian aid, responding to humanitarian crises in DPRK, and in
economic development pillars. Like any other aid agency in the country, UNA works jointly with
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the DPRK government to develop the country program, which is approved by UNA’s governing
Executive Board, constituted as it is in UN multilateral agencies of various Member States.
Sometime in the past decade, due to some allegations of mismanagement and wrong doing that
had surfaced against UNA in DPRK, the UNA Executive Board imposed a number of conditions
in regard to human resource management, financial management, audit and oversight matters on
UNA’s programs in DPRK. For the purposes of this research, we shall concentrate on the HRM
related conditions:
In the area of Human Resource Management, DPRK national staff were removed from
core organizational duties. DPRK colleagues were no longer to be seconded to UNA from DPRK
government but instead DPRK nationals were to be directly given UNA contracts. National staff
salaries would be paid directly to them instead of the previous practice of paying the
government. The idea behind these changes was to align UNA national staff to standard practices
prevalent for UNA national staff in other countries, and thereby have greater control and loyalty
from UNA national staff and embed them more deeply in UNA organizational culture, weaning
them away from government influence and dependence.
UNA’s revised management practices and conditions caused consternation for the
government of DPRK. The government viewed the situation as being motivated by political
pressure on UNA from hostile donor countries on the governing Executive Board of UNA.

Role of the DPRK Government in UNA Programs
As a UN agency, the legal framework for UNA’s operations in a country lays out the
parameters of the relationship between it and the host government. This legal framework signed
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with DPRK was a standard agreement, and hence it addressed only in broad terms the obligations
of UNA and DPRK government on UNA’s operations in the country.
But the devil lay in the details. The UNA-DPRK legal framework, for instance, did not
address such issues as HR management practices, financial management practices, or anything
about the nitty-gritty of daily UNA operations in DPRK, where there were grounds for micro
level manipulation and pressure by the government. There were reportedly unintended use of
UNA funding that was meant to support government ministries and departments with whom
UNA worked closely as program counterparts.

UNA’s DPRK Country Office Profile
As in other countries, the government of DPRK and UNA worked together closely on
strategies and goals that would address the needs on the ground and also support the
government’s national priorities for DPRK. Based on the broader strategies and goals, UNADPRK in collaboration with the government would approve projects for implementation in the
country. In other countries where UNA works, the Country Office and UNA country leadership
have a lot of influence in shaping these projects.
However, for the UNA-DPRK Country Office, the Regional Headquarters of UNA
withdrew a lot of the authority for project formulation, approval and implementation, which are
otherwise vested in the Country Office. This was done due to the sensitivity of the geopolitical
situation and the donor countries. The UA Regional HQ also provided a higher than normal
amount of oversight on UNA-DPRK’s daily activities.
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UNA DPRK also faced issues from the DPRK government counterparts on access to
project sites for monitoring and project management. I have written elsewhere on these and
related difficulties that UN and aid agencies face in operating in DPRK:
Aid agencies in DPR Korea often complain (mostly informally) that they are not
allowed by the government to conduct the kind of in-depth analyses needed for more
ambitious programming; and the donors stymie many attempts at increased scope and
scale of activities. Aid agencies in DPR Korea are already known to impose their own
form of conditionality. Named the “no access-no aid” principle (literally, DPR Korea
authorities are reluctant to grant aid agency and their resident expatriate workers
physical access to areas and populations for which/whom they request aid from
agencies), aid agencies use this for trust-building and negotiations with national
counterparts for improved access to affected populations. In response, the government
sometimes makes access dependent on the financial scope of the engagement (to
maximize the amount of aid money available, they employ a reverse principle, known
in Pyongyang circles as, “no aid-no access”!). The DPR Korea government imposes
other conditions: for many aid agencies, independent project monitoring is not allowed
and all monitoring is required through ministries and/or national counterparts. Then
there is the “7-day notification rule”—under which every project visit has to be
requested from and approved by the government with a minimum seven days notice.
Although many such conditions vary and are relaxed from time to time, on the whole
the operating environment facing aid agencies in DPR Korea remain challenging (Sen
2012: 12).
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UNA DPRK Staffing Arrangements
International Staff
The UNA DPRK Country Office international staff were primarily with two types of
contracts, based on two different sources of funding for their salaries and emoluments. One type,
usually for higher country level managers, were funded by “core” funds; as core funding is more
continuous, these staff therefore had more permanency to their contractual status with UNA. The
other type was funded through various combinations of project funds; as funds for projects are
more intermittent, dependent on the vagaries of donor funding, the contracts of project staff were
more temporary, such as of annual or bi-annual duration. It has been a continuing issue that core
staff positions in UNA DPRK Country Office were so few, yet the sensitivity of the work in
DPRK required more core staff. There is some allegation that the light core funding was at least
partly due to the geopolitical environment, which should not have been the case given neutrality
of UN organizations. I have written elsewhere that this lack of job security for expat staff
potentially compromises their actions and decisions (Sen 2012).

National Staff
In DPRK’s socialist economy, the lack of a labor market requires foreign organizations to
request the government counterparts and be dependent on them for recruitment of national
personnel. There are many issues with this practice: limited opportunity to interview
government-referred candidates; limited opportunity to assess their suitability for proposed work;
limited opportunities to manage, motivate, guide, and/or discipline such personnel (as they are
not technically the agency’s employee); limitations to retain such personnel for a length of time
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considered desirable for the organization. Due to the short tenures and high rotation of national
personnel, UNA’s investment in their training and capacity-building was often compromised.
Salaries of local personnel were negotiated with the government and paid by UNA
directly to the DPRK government. In addition to the salary, a monthly meal allowance was paid
directly to one designated national colleague, who would then distribute the allowance amongst
the local staff. This was the usual practice of foreign missions and international NGOs in DPRK.
. UNA-DPRK had only a few national officers who had been with the Country Office for
a long time and had acquired the necessary skills gained from long periods of service. Such
capable, long term national employees, however, were the exception; generally, there was no
standard period of assignment for Korean national staff. Local staff was assigned on an annual
rotational basis and there was the perception that the government used the UNA rotation as a
training office. UNA-DPRK had therefore requested the government to increase the length of
rotation of national staff, and there was some evidence that this request was granted.
The hiring of national staff for the UNA office was not a practice unique to the DPRK,
but rather was one used by all international agencies and embassies in the DPRK, and said to be
modeled after the U.S. Embassy in China. What was unique to the DPRK was the level of
choice, or lack thereof, that the Country Office had in selecting its local personnel.
In terms of location and overall functioning of the UNA-DPRK office, all international
organizations and offices, including embassies, were physically isolated in a diplomats’
compound. All local personnel arrived and left together by transportation that UNA arranged,
working from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Because local personnel left at 5:00 p.m., the international
staff were usually the ones to close the office.
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Analysis
Given the above theoretical discussion of socialist organizations and socialist
management practices, followed by the account of actual organizational actions and management
practices of the foreign organization working in DPRK, we now consider how those actions and
practices fare in terms of enhancing organizational effectiveness, in the table below:
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Table 1.
Category of
actions/
practices
Human
Resource
Management
(HRM)

Organizational Action/
Practices

Sources

Reasons

Possible Impacts on Organizational
Effectiveness

Local personnel removed from
core staff duties

UN/ Author’s
observation

Risk reduction/
mitigation
measure by UNA
management

The resulting mistrust between Korean
colleagues and expat managers, as
agents of the organization, should
hamper psychological contract4 between
managers and local employees
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HRM

4

In lieu of the current agreement UN
between the government and
UNA for local personnel,
individual service agreements
between Korean nationals and
UNA were to be created, to
then be converted into regular
UNA contracts, with salaries

Donor pressure on
UNA to improve
HRM in DPRK

Removal of local staff from core duties
restricts them to lower duties only;
hence, exchanges between such staff
and managers will remain merely
transactional, as opposed to something
deeper…which too would hamper strong
psychological contract
Attempts by UNA managers to win over
some extent of control on local staff
through contractual and financial
remuneration means

Psychological contract is a complex concept formed by an individual’s perception of mutual obligations that exist between herself and her employer. These
obligations arise out of the belief that a promise has been made either explicitly or implicitly and the fulfillment of promissory obligations by one party is
contingent upon the fulfillment of obligations by the other. The mutual obligations are thus sustained through the norm of reciprocity. (Coyle-Shapiro & Parzefall
2008: 8)

Category of
actions/
practices

Institutional
arrangement/
environment
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HRM

HRM

Organizational Action/
Practices
paid directly to the local
personnel
Government structure included
a number of Ministries,
bureaus, commissions, and
institutes which interfaced with
UNA on many fronts including
in project implementation. In
their capacity as implementing
agencies or government
partners, these myriad entities
received financial support from
UNA for their work with UNA
projects.
There was no standard period
of assignment for Korean
national staff. Local staff were
assigned on an annual
rotational basis and there was
the perception that the
government used the UNA
rotation as a training office
The DPRK was unable to
guarantee the length of time
that local personnel were
posted to a position,
diminishing the effect of UNA’s

Sources

Reasons

UN/ Author’s
observation

Possible Impacts on Organizational
Effectiveness

Opens up possibilities for exerting
political pressure on UNA, leading to
political isomorphism

UN/ Author’s
observation

Manipulation of
human resources
by government

Short stints predisposed exchanges
between Korean local staff and expat
managers to remain merely
transactional…and hence precluded
formation of strong psychological
contracts

UN

Manipulation of
human resources
by government

Exchanges between Korean local staff
and expat managers to remain merely
transactional…and hence precluded
formation of strong psychological
contracts

Category of
actions/
practices

HRM

HRM
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HRM

Organizational Action/
Practices
investment in training and
capacity-building for staff
UNA-DPRK requested that local
personnel be assigned to the
UNA office for a longer period
of time, and there was some
evidence that this request was
granted.

The lack of a functioning labor
market in the DPRK meant that
the government assigned local
personnel required by UNA for
its program operations. UNA
had only limited opportunity to
interview government-referred
candidates and determine their
appropriateness for the role.
There were no mechanisms in
place for staff performance
reviews and appraisals to
evaluate the work of national
staff
Periodically, the DPRK
government would reassign
local staff. When reassignments

Sources

Reasons

Possible Impacts on Organizational
Effectiveness

UN

Manipulation of
human resources
by government;
and doling out
small concessions
to impress upon
UNA/its expat
managers
Manipulation of
human resources
by government

Evidence of extracting some concessions
from the government by UNA-DPRK

Manipulation of
human resources
by government;

Evidence of extracting some concessions
from the government by UNA-DPRK

UN

UN

Essentially, this meant that expat
managers had very little effective
management control over their Korean
national colleagues

Category of
actions/
practices
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Institutional
arrangement/
relationship
with
government
Physical/
infrastructural
environment

Organizational Action/
Practices
occurred, the government
would inform UNA-DPRK of the
reassignment and send
replacement candidates. It
seems that the government
usually only sent one such
candidate, limiting the Country
Office’s choice. UNA-DPRK later
persuaded their DPRK
government counterparts to
send two candidates from
which to choose.
No aid no access-no access no
aid practice

In terms of location and overall
functioning of the UNA-DPRK
office, all international
organizations and offices,
including embassies, were
physically isolated in a
diplomats’ compound. All local
personnel arrived and left
together by transportation that

Sources

Reasons

Possible Impacts on Organizational
Effectiveness

and doling out
small concessions
for influence

Author’s
observation

UN/ Author’s
observation

Government-aid
agency
negotiation for
ready access to
project sites in
exchange for aid
Government
attempt to
minimize contact
between resident
expat staff and
local population/
political

Evidence of extracting some concessions
from the government by UNA-DPRK

Minimal personal/after hours interaction
between expat managers and national
colleagues inhibits formation of team
spirit, loyalties and strong psychological
contract

Category of
actions/
practices

Physical/
infrastructural
environment
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Principal-Agent
relations

Organizational Action/
Practices
UNA arranged, working from
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Because
local personnel left at 5:00
p.m., the international staff
were usually the ones to close
the office.
Separate telecommunication
systems between nationals and
internationals in DPRK; national
colleagues cannot call
international colleagues and
vice versa
Regional HQ withdrew project
approval authority from the
head of UNA office in DPRK and
retained such authority for
itself. This was done in part to
allow for higher level decisionmaking on projects, which were
subject to scrutiny by donor
countries, and to assist the
head of UNA DPRK office in his
relationship with the
government. Thus, while the
role of
UNA-DPRK included project

Sources

Reasons

Possible Impacts on Organizational
Effectiveness

Author’s
observation

Government
attempt to
minimize contact
between resident
expat staff and
local population/
political
Donor pressure on
UNA

Minimal personal/after hours interaction
between expat managers and national
colleagues inhibits formation of team
spirit, loyalties and strong psychological
contract

UN

This situation essentially created
confusion and mistrust between UNA’s
HQ- and Country-based managers

Category of
actions/
practices

Funding
resources
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Interpersonal
relation

Organizational Action/
Practices

Sources

oversight, a significant amount
of project oversight and
decision-making authority
rested with the UNA Regional
HQ.
Core funding in the DPRK was
UN
very light, meaning that there
were fewer core positions than
in other Country Offices,
despite repeated requests from
the field, detailed expression of
short staffing at the country
office, and explicit
recommendation for an
increase in core-funded
positions. The light core funding
was in great part due to the
geopolitical environment in
which the UNA-DPRK office
existed and tension between
UNA Headquarters
management and the Country
Office over increasing funding
and core staff for the DPRK.
Expat managers giving small
Author’s
gifts on their own volition to
observation
national colleagues engendered

Reasons

Possible Impacts on Organizational
Effectiveness

Donor pressure on
UNA; funding
scarcity

This created contractual uncertainty for
UNA expat staff on the ground, which
resulted in them not ‘rocking the boat’

Building relational coordination, i.e.,
coordination carried out through
emergent relationships of shared goals,

Category of
actions/
practices

Organizational Action/
Practices
some small levels of loyalty and
team spirit

Sources

Reasons

Possible Impacts on Organizational
Effectiveness
knowledge, and mutual respect. Strong
relationships enable employees to
embrace their connections with one
another and to more effectively
coordinate the work in which they are
engaged (Peltokorpi 2014: 449).
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Discussion
In the 1990s, as many socialist economies disintegrated, the respective countries
experienced major economic shocks of high inflation, precipitous falls in GDP, etc. In such
circumstances, the establishment of macroeconomic stability became a natural focus and policy
approach. However, subsequent experience showed us that the preoccupation with
macroeconomic issues and macro stabilization programs would tend to fail in the absence of or
with inadequate micro adjustment (Svejnar 1991: 123). This was because socialist systems
created microeconomic distortions (such as, lack of incentives for workers of an organization to
respond to economic forces and fundamentals that affect the organization) that impacted the
macro picture; hence, the micro-macro links are consequential.
Similarly, a disconnect between structures of incentives facing expat managers and
DPRK national workers is becoming evident from the operations of foreign organizations in
DPRK. The above analysis has highlighted that manager-national interaction in foreign
organizations operating in DPRK remain largely transactional, devoid of the possibility of deep
bonding and loyalties. Such limited interaction, and the extant social and political controls in
DPRK as well as the foreign organizations’ own practices to mitigate their risks (which
collectively constitute the operating environment that foreign organizations in DPRK find
themselves in), pose significant barriers to the formation of psychological contracts between
DPRK national workers and expat managers. Psychological contracts, good team relationships,
etc., are constructs and practices in organizational dynamics that lead, through the formation of
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cognitive mechanisms such as transactive memory systems (TMS)5, to improved task
coordination and enhanced team performance.
Although, to be sure, there is some evidence from the above case study of UNA that
limited formation of interpersonal relations is possible, which can build relational coordination.
Other such examples, as the initial lack of interaction between expat managers and DPRK
worker, followed by tentative growing interaction, correlated with preliminary signs of
improving knowledge management skills come from case studies of Kaesong Industrial
Complex. It was noted that management-to-worker face-to-face interactions were limited at the
initial opening of KIC factories. At first, ROK management was not allowed to eat lunch with
workers. Gradually, the DPRK government allowed ROK/South Korean management to remain
in Kaesong on a semi-permanent basis. The resultant growing familiarity with ROK managers
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and their interaction with DPRK national staff (such as DPRK workers bringing home-cooked
food for the expat managers, possibly as reciprocity for ‘choco pies’) potentially led to ‘tacit
knowledge to be exchanged between management and workers knowledge in settings other than
the job site’ (Gower 2011: 20-21).
Overall, however, the analysis of foreign organizations working in DPRK described
significant difficulties in formation of strong team dynamics between expatriate managers and
DPRK nationals. As a result, these organizations’ operating environment is structurally
indisposed for the accomplishment of complex, interdependent tasks, which in turn affect their
effectiveness.
5

Transactive memory systems (TMS) (Wegner 1986) are cognitive processes and outcomes in knowledge-intensive
teams (Peltokorpi 2008), such that team members collectively develop to encode, store, and retrieve information in
different domains. This is possible as team members are aware who knows what, are able to specialize in different
but compatible information domains, and use each other as external cognitive aids (Lewis 2003; Peltokorpi 2014:
445).
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The conditions preventing deeper connection between expat managers and their national
colleagues assume significance also when seen in light of our above theoretical discussion of
socialist and post socialist organization management and change. We have seen that personnel
inculcated in socialist values and management practices have a tendency to cling to old habits.
Only serious and sustained change pressures can eventually lead them to embrace some hybrid
form of old and new management practice. In the case of UNA, according to this author, the
organization has exerted more known pressure than any other organization working in DPRK on
the national counterparts and on UNA’s national colleagues (through their organizational
socialization process) for change towards international standards. However, the capacity for
exerting pressure for any one organization such as UNA is obviously limited. The embeddedness
of national colleagues outside of UNA is much stronger than their embeddedness within UNA’s
organizational culture. Hard pressure needs to be supplemented/ balanced with soft measures—
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reflected through HR management practices; employee motivations; ideologies and negotiation
dynamics. Both hard and soft approaches are necessary and neither alone will be sufficient.

Recommendations
While detailed recommendations should be organization specific and, thus, outside the
scope of this research, some general directions follow:
Clearly, encouraging interpersonal interaction between expat managers and DPRK
workers is expected to be impactful. The problem in this strategy, of course, would be how to
prevent free riding and related manipulation (e.g., what if some national colleagues put up a
show of loyalty and others have subversive intentions behind the scenes?); adverse selection
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(how to distinguish between ‘sincere stand-offs’ vs. sycophants?); the dangers of punitive action
by DPRK authorities against DPRK workers and expat managers (DPRK has social controls in
place and discourages intermingling of foreigners and its nationals). In this effort, lessons may be
drawn from actual cases of expat managers, for example, of UNA who have practiced many
small gestures of informal relationship building at the personal level with their national
colleagues, as noted above. Another example is of relationship building between managers and
staff at Kaesong. Such cases have generally yielded uptick of positive returns (e.g., relational
coordination) from the relationships. It seems the underlying psycho-social mechanism is that
national staff have become at least to some extent bound to reciprocity by the unanticipated
goodwill shown towards them. Such quotidian reciprocity, at least to some extent has begun to
mitigate the inherent ideological differences and related divisions that may exist between
national and international colleagues.
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Another option would be for the foreign organizations to provide DPRK based expat
managers with incentives to move away from business-as-usual and experiment with new forms
of business and engagement. Expat managers working in DPRK are torn between, on the one
hand, significant pressure and propaganda from DPRK designed to persuade the managers to
satisfy DPRK’s agenda, and on the other hand, pressures from their respective ‘headquarters’ to
accomplish corporate mandates; the two are often at odds. Hence, creative middle paths or
alternative ways need to be found. Incentives, therefore, could include, e.g., assurances of job
security if managers’ experimentation leads to unsuccessful results. Such measures should
provide expat managers the incentive to remain tough in the face of domestic pressures or,
perhaps, to rock the boat if they feel the prevailing environment is not conducive to efficiency
gains, and thus change the dynamics of negotiation between DPRK and foreign organizations.
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This accords with the reality as we have seen in the case study above, where strong positions by
expat managers have yielded concessions from DPRK in the area of Human Resource
Management, as in the case of UNA-DPRK persuading their DPRK government counterparts to
send more than one candidate, thus expanding the pool or choice of candidates from which
international managers can hire new national staff.
Of course none of the abovementioned measures is standalone, and indeed must be
implemented in a package of measures that looks at the entirety of the foreign organizationDPRK counterpart relationship comprehensively. At the end of the day, DPRK counterparts to
foreign organizations need to be convinced of the benefits from any change process.
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APPENDIX

Non-UN actors in DPRK6
EUPS 1 (Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale)
Health: physical rehabilitation of Operating Theatre and Delivery Room in 2 hospitals in
Hamhung city/hygiene, waste management and sterilization/provision of medical
equipments/midwifery training/Ambulance service setup/First Aid training for 5 factories health
workers.
Food Security: project to improve the nutritional status of rural and urban South Hwangae
children by strengthening the production, processing and distribution of goat and soybean milk.
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EUPS 2 (Save the Children International)
Save the Children is the largest international voluntary agency working for the rights and welfare
of Children in over fifty developing countries of the world. Save the Children works as EUPS
Unit 2 in DPRK which opened its office in DPRK in August 2003 and implemented a small
project rehabilitating thirty-one nurseries and kindergartens. Since then EUPS Unit 2 has been
implementing Integrated Environmental Health (IEH) Projects and Food Security (FS) Projects
in South Hamgyong Province.
Integrated Environmental Health Project:

6

United Nations in DPRK 2014.
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The IEH Project consists of five main components:
1. provision of clean water to households and in key community facilities;
2. provision of hygienic sanitation and solid waste management and the promotion of twin-pit
VIP latrines through a community partnership approach;
3. rehabilitation of community health facilities and provision of equipment;
4. local capacity building through the training of village technicians and the formation of
mothers groups with training in health promotion;
5. training for health staff in partnership with the Medical Science Information Centre (MSIC),
affiliated with the Ministry of Health with a focus on essential maternal and newborn care.
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Approximately 49,000 households have been connected to improved water supply systems and
hygiene education conducted among the communities.
Food Security
The Food Security programme implements two approaches that address food security in the
DPRK and integrates this with water sanitation and health to increase the overall reach of the
projects and to more effectively make stakeholders aware of the link between nutrition, overall
sanitation and health.
The first is addressing the nutritional food security shortfall that vulnerable groups are exposed
to during the winter months. Since vegetable supply during the winter is minimal and results in
vitamin and micronutrient deficiencies by spring.
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A total of 36 green houses have been constructed to produce sufficient vegetables for the winter
period for the Institutions of Care in Hamhung City which includes in addition to crèches,
kindergartens, orphanages, primary schools facilities that cater to the elderly, the disabled,
several TB and hepatitis sanatoria, and the paediatric and maternity hospitals. It is estimated by
the stakeholders in the project that the general population of Hamhung with an estimated
800,000 population, but especially its children will be able to eat more varied diet of vegetables
during the winter.
We work closely with the Pyongyang Vegetable Research Institute to facilitate the introduction
of vegetables with high protein (pulses), essential nutrient and micronutrient content; and the
mentoring of farm technicians to strengthen greenhouse operational and production expertise and
skills.
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Other projects address the need to protect agricultural land from inundation damage and
environmental degradation. An integrated watershed management project in Yonggwang,
Jongpyong and Sinpo counties has the objective of protecting and rehabilitating agricultural land
for sustainable crop production. This includes the rehabilitation of irrigation headwork
infrastructure to increase the area available for irrigated rice, corn, and vegetable cropping from
spring to summer; the augmentation of facilities to provide increased reforestation material; and
the stabilisation of slope land through soil and water conservation structures. Thus the project,
through its activities has increased the calorific and nutritional food security for stakeholders and
beneficiaries.
EUPS 2 is also working on providing better access to dietary diversification through a project
that targets children in schools by supporting local capacities.
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EUPS 2 is working to provide lasting benefits to children and will reach 500,000 beneficiaries
through its current programme over the next 3 years.
EUPS 2 also worked in the field of children’s nutrition during the end of 2011 and through to
2012. The organization hopes to pursue activities in this sector further in the future.
EUPS 2 considers that Disaster Preparedness and response is an integral part to every
programme, according we actively seek funds for pre-positioning of emergency stock. EUPS 2
has been working in the field of emergency response and pre-positioned non-food items in South
Hamgyong Province for upcoming emergency.

EUPS 3 (Concern Worldwide) EUPS Unit 3 (Concern Worldwide)
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Programme Overview
History of the Country Programme
Concern arrived in 1998 to assist in the aftermath of extensive flood damage in the country.
There was initial involvement in relief but this evolved into rehabilitation and is now shifting
towards development. Concern has worked since 2005 under the umbrella of the ‘European
Union Programme Support’ (EUPS) and is now locally recognised as EUPS Unit 3. Concern is
one of only six INGOs in DPRK. Development actions have been addressing immediate,
medium-term and long-term needs (in order inter alia to improve returns to assets and to reduce
the risk of malnutrition and water/sanitation-related disease) of the most vulnerable population.
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Concern has also helped to identify policy and strategy concerning the simultaneous protection
and development of natural/environmental resources.
The key problems in DPRK are complex and chronic (structural). Concern’s approaches of
pioneering work have demonstrated ways to sustainably improve household food security,
nutrition and access to clean water and sanitation. Our approaches have been recognized and
replicated by government and non government institutions. We continue therefore to build our
programme based on past experience and emerging new opportunity.
Coverage
We have been working in South Pyongan and North Hwanghae Provinces and recently in
Kangwon Province which is considered to be one of the poorest areas in DPRK.
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We also started work on a trial farm in Ryongsong district in Pyongyang. The current strategic
plan is expected to spread actions to 7 counties in North/South-East Provinces which are
considered to be amongst the poorest. Annual beneficiaries would number about 150,000 to
200,000.
Core Funding
Core funding comes from EU (AIDCO) (40%), Irish Aid (IA) (30%) and SIDA (20%).
Additional funding (10%) comes from Concern, UNICEF, WHO, Bank of Ireland, Irish Gas and
UK Embassy.
Our work in the DPR Korea
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We support the extreme poor in disadvantaged areas in order to contribute to sustainable
improvement in their lives through programmes focusing on: (i) improvement in household and
community assets and (ii) reduction in risk, vulnerability and inequality. Programmes aim to be
replicable without ongoing support from Concern.
Our Projects
Our main Water, Environment and Health (WEH) and Food, Income & Market Programme
(FIM) programmes comprise several projects. These include:
Kumchon Water and Environmental Health Project (SIDA)-2011-2013
Multi-Sector Nutrition & Food Security (MSNFS) Project – (EU) – 2012-2014
Singye Water and Sanitation Project (CUSA)-2012
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Community-Based Urban Nutrition and Food Security Project (EU)-2009-2012
Conservation Agriculture for Sustainable Food Security in Agro-climatic Zones (Irish Aid)2012-2015

EUPS 4 (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe)
Welthungerhilfe has been working in the DPRK since 1997, shortly after the country had been
hit by a severe hunger catastrophe. During the first years, Welthungerhilfe distributed mainly
emergency items: food, coal and winter clothes. At the end of the 1990s we started to implement
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in cooperation with our Korean partners and stakeholders agricultural projects in South
Hwanghae and North Pyong’an Provinces to support people and cooperatives to produce food by
themselves. The agricultural cooperatives were supported to improve their seeds, to diversify and
intensify agricultural production and to maintain their agricultural machinery in a more efficient
way.
After 2000, the field and sectors of operations were expanded. Integrated rural development
projects were carried out. Renewable energy approaches were introduced. Hundreds of
greenhouses were built, mainly in the neighborhood of social institutions, like kindergartens and
nursery homes, providing them with fresh vegetables all year round. Villages and towns have
been supplied with clean drinking water systems and have now safe and clean water throughout
the day. A large maize seed processing factory has been built which contributes essentially to the
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food production in DPRK. Barren hills and mountains are reforested in order to prevent future
disasters like landslides and floods. Sloping land user groups were introduced to agro-forestry
approaches in order to produce in a sustainable way food as well on sloping lands.
In our work we follow principles of mutual respect and understanding, openness and
transparency.

EUPS 5 (Triangle Génération Humanitaire)
Triangle Génération Humanitaire provides concrete solutions to alleviate the suffering of
populations living in unacceptable circumstances. It fights poverty and defends social
integration. It offers support to victims of conflict, natural catastrophes and other events causing
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precarious living conditions. Triangle GH’s action, integrating emergency and development, is
characterized by a global, comprehensive approach to humanitarian assistance.
In DPRK, since its initial survey in August 1998, and the subsequent installation of the mission
in December 2000, Triangle GH has performed some 27 programs ranging from agricultural
development which included rehabilitation of 11.000 hectares of tideland dedicated to rice
production, to rehabilitation of drinking water networks and sanitation infrastructures, thermal
insulation of schools and medical facilities, emergency supplies after the Ryongchon rail
catastrophe in 2004, and social assistance to elderly in partnership with the Korean Federation
for the Care of the Aged People (KFCA).
Food Security Programme
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One of the elements of the food crisis presently striking the DPRK is the lack of proteins and
micronutrient in the food. This nutritional deficiency particularly affects young children between
0 and 6 years old (11% of the population) whose specific nutritional needs can’t be covered. The
taking care of young children being normally assumed by the social institutions, the
improvement and sustainable diversification of their food goes through the support to the
communitarian farm units producing for these institutions.
Triangle GH’s project teams are now involved in supporting 2 inland fish farms of South
Hamgyong Province (in Sinhung and Yonggwang Counties) and 2 dairy farms in Sariwon city
(South Hwanghae Province) and Daeane city (Nampo District), with integrated activities in
relevant food processing, conservation and distribution sectors. The main activities undertaken
from January 2010 to August 2013 in the framework of the program are the following:
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•

Inception phase, baseline survey and stakeholders’ capacities assessment.

•

Design of integrated fish farming production model.

•

Design of cropping systems and livestock management models.

•

Design of logistic model for preservation and distribution of the fish production.

•

Design of logistic model for transportation and distribution of the milk and dairy

products.
•

Purchase of equipment and materials to support fish – crop – livestock productions.

•

Construction/rehabilitation works to support fish – crop – livestock productions.

•

Purchase of equipment and materials to support milk – livestock productions and milk
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processing.
•

Construction/rehabilitation works to support livestock – milk productions.

•

Purchase of equipment and materials to support new logistic models.

•

Purchase of equipment and materials to support improved feeding practices in child

institutions.
•

Setting up of pilot activities in Jung Ak farm and replication of outputs in dairy farms.

•

Setting-up of networks with cooperative farms for knowledge and inputs exchanges.

•

Trainings on integrated fish farming practices, fish farm management, fish preservation

methods and income generating activities related with fish sector.
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•

Trainings on farming practices, animal husbandry, livestock management.

•

Trainings on nutrition education and hygiene practices for the staff of child welfare

institutions.
The Food Security Programme will benefit to 90 000 persons in South Hamgyong Province and
65,000 persons in South Hwanghae and Nampo District.
Water Sanitation and Hygiene Programme
The overwhelming needs in terms of water and sanitation led Triangle GH to carry out projects
to rehabilitate and to improve water supplies, especially in urban areas, where an estimated 60%
of DPRK population live. These urban populations, such as Munchon inhabitants, are bound to
be considerably more vulnerable to water-borne diseases than the rural populations.
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The town of Munchon, 42 500 inhabitants, is located on the eastern coast of DPRK. Like many
cities of the country, its public water system was built in the 1960’s and owing to the lack of
maintenance the system became obsolete and had multiple breakdowns. Previous projects run by
Triangle GH led rehabilitated a major portion of the water system. However, one district out of
the town’s four districts still lacks access to potable water. The current program aims to tackle
this lack of access to potable water and to improve the environmental sanitation in Munchon
town.
The main activities undertaken from October 2009 to November 2011 in the framework of the
program include conducting baseline surveys, drafting technical designs and engineering
specifications, construction and rehabilitation for latrines, DEWATS units, wastewater channels
network, and water supply network extensions. It also included testing of the rehabilitated
58

facilities, trainings of Munchon technical staff and focal points, and publishing awareness tools
on hygiene promotion and water use. The Programme will benefit to 42 500 persons in Kangwon
Province.
Psychosocial and Social Assistance Programme
Due to the lack of funding, this program has been suspended since 2008. However, in 2012
renewed access to the Korean Federation for the Care of the Aged (KFCA) allowed to submit a
concept note to the European Commission (DevCo) to support the federation in strengthening its
advocacy and fund raising capacities and provide direct support to several provincial Old People
Homes (infrastructural & water and sanitation intervention, provision of drugs and support to inhouse vegetable and agricultural production)
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Comprehensive list of donors
DEVCO – EuropeAid Cooperation Office; for the Food Security and WASH programs
SIDA – Swedish Cooperation; for the WASH program
Aide Alimentaire Programmé (French Government inter-ministries humanitarian fund); for the
Food Security program

EUPS 7 (Handicap International)
Disability profile of DPRK - According to the analysis of the data from the 2008 DPRK Census
conducted by the Central Statistical Bureau, people with disabilities constitute 6.3% of the
population aged 5 years and above. There is no data available on children with disabilities in the
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age group of 0-5 years and the overall prevalence could be much higher if disabilities in this age
group are also taken into consideration. There is a higher prevalence of disability among the
female population. Between urban and rural populations, the rural population has higher
prevalence in all forms of disability. Disability increases as age progresses in DPRK making it
crucial to address disability issues among older persons and also among women in DPRK.
About Handicap International (HI)
HI which is referred to as European Union Programme Support Unit 07 (EUPS 7) in DPRK has
been implementing projects and programmes for persons with disabilities since 2001. The
activities are jointly implemented with its national partner, the Korean Federation for the
Protection of Disabled People (KFPD). The key thematic areas of involvement are;
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Physical Rehabilitation, Institutional Capacity-Building, Advocacy, Education, Livelihoods and
Inclusive Sports, Arts and Culture
Physical Rehabilitation; HI has been supporting 2 physical rehabilitation centres in the form of
technical skill building, supply of raw materials and in production of orthotic and prosthetic
devices.
Advocacy; Along with the KFPD, HI has been advocating for the inclusion of disabled people in
the national humanitarian and development agenda of the government, UN ,Donors and INGOs
that are working in DPRK. Mainstreaming disability within the policies and programmes of the
government and the UN has been a key activity since 2009. Raising awareness about issues
confronting people with disabilities is one of the major advocacy works of HI and KFPD in
DPRK.
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Livelihood; Along with KFPD, programmes for income generation and improvement in the
livelihoods of people with disabilities has been implemented in select provinces of DPRK. KFPD
has also been providing vocational training through its centres in Pyongyang and Wanson.
Institutional Capacity-Building; HI has been involved in building the capacity of the KFPD Head
Office and its branches in all the provinces in key areas such as project cycle management,
finance management, implementation of DPRK disability legislation and in advocating for
inclusion of disabled people in the national policies and programmes.
Education: HI in partnership with KFPD has been supporting 11 special schools for children with
sensory disabilities in the form of infrastructure renovation, teachers training and integrating
education with health and nutrition by constructing Green Houses.
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Inclusive Sports, Arts and Culture; With a view to promote inclusive communities for persons
with disabilities, HI and KFPD have been promoting inclusive sports, arts and cultural events.
These initiatives have led to increase in awareness about issues confronting disabled people and
are paving way for their inclusion within the communities.

Red Cross Movement
IFRC -- The programmes supported by the IFRC in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) are all streamlined with the strategic aims of IFRC’s Strategy 2020:
Strategic aim 1: Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters
Strategic aim 2: Enable healthy and safe living
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Strategic aim 3: Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace
The IFRC supports the DPRK Red Cross in four areas: health and care, water and sanitation,
disaster management, and organizational development. The provision of essential medicines to
2,030 clinics remains the largest component of Federation support. At the same time, the health
and care programme has successfully piloted the community-based health and first aid (CBHFA)
programme in two counties and expanding the activities in new areas. The main focus of
CBHFA is to empower communities through activities related to health promotion, health in
emergencies, first aid and behavior change communication. Within the water and sanitation
programme, the ongoing construction of 19 water and sanitation systems will bring the total
number of people supplied with clean drinking water in the past ten years to over 600,000. The
disaster management programme is strongly focusing on community-based disaster risk
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reduction (CDRR) including strengthening community-based mechanisms for disaster
preparedness, awareness generation, early warning system, mitigation measures (like river
dykes, culverts, irrigation channels etc.) , tree planting as a long-term mitigation measure, as well
as on livelihood-improvement for the reduction of vulnerability. Also, road safety is becoming
increasingly important with the rapidly growing number of cars, especially in Pyongyang. Along
with this, strengthening DPRK Red Cross for emegency response is also a priority area of work.
The DPRK Red Cross works in the framework of a three-year cooperation agreement strategy
(CAS) with nine partner national societies: Australian Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, Danish
Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, German Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross, Norwegian Red
Cross, Spanish Red Cross, and Swedish Red Cross. The current CAS agreement up to 2012 was
signed in October 2009. The DPRK country plan and budget is supported by Danish Red
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Cross/Danish government, Finnish Red Cross/Finnish government, German Red Cross/German
government, Japanese Red Cross, Netherlands government, Norwegian Red Cross/Norwegian
government, Spanish Red Cross, British Red Cross and Swedish Red Cross/Swedish
government. In addition, three Europe Aid-funded projects are being implemented through the
Danish Red Cross; Swedish Red Cross; and Finnish Red Cross.
In a significant new development, Red Cross Red Crescent support to the DPRK has been
boosted by a 500,000 Euro grant from the European Commission, made through the Swedish
Red Cross, for a three-year project to enhance resilience in face of disasters and food security.
The project will assist 25,000 people in the Pukchang and Unsan districts of South Phyongan
Province. It will be implemented in cooperation with the DPRK Red Cross, IFRC, Danish Red
Cross, Finnish Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross and Swedish Red Cross, along with
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contributions from other partners.
At county, provincial, and national level, the ministries of public health, city management,
people’s security, and land and environmental protection contribute with technical advice and
material support to the Red Cross programmes. Collaboration with UN agencies consists of
information exchange as well as the agreement on the contents of the medical kits, the role
division in disaster response situations, and training initiatives in different areas. The Red Cross
also benefits from specialized expertise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in the
DPRK, where they are called European Union project support (EUPS) units.

ICRC:
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Assists three Provincial hospitals in the DPRK with on-site training, rehabilitation, material and
drugs donations.
Supports physical a rehabilitation centre in providing services to an increasing number of
beneficiaries, notably with construction material donations to extend the centre capacity in
Pyongyang.
Strengthens dialogue with the DPRK authorities and National Society

Resident Bilateral/Governmental Missions
Swiss Agency for Development and Corporation (SDC) -- The Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation (SDC) is supporting the DPR of Korea in its efforts to cultivate sloping lands
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for agricultural purposes and to protect them against erosion. It promotes the health of the
population by providing better access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities. It
also distributes milk powder through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP).
Sloping Land Management
Agricultural use of sloping land and protection against erosion.
Food shortages have forced farmers to make use of very steep sloping land. This has led to
deforestation and erosion, thus increasing the risk of natural disasters. Since 2005 the SDC, in
cooperation with local partners, has promoted the sustainable production of rice, potatoes, wheat
and other crops on sloping land. Moreover this land has been protected against erosion by
planting fruit trees and grass ledges on the slopes.
64

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
Improved health thanks to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities.
Poorly maintained water supplies and the lack of sanitary installations are the causes of many
diseases. Diarrhoea and related illnesses are widespread in the DPRK. Those affected suffer from
the loss of valuable vitamins and calories.
Clean drinking water improves food security, reduces child mortality, combats poverty and
contributes generally to better health for people in the DPRK.
Food Security
Swiss milk powder for mothers and children.
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Switzerland delivers milk powder to WFP in DPRK since 1995. Local production units process
the milk powder together with rice, maize, cereals and soya to create food that is rich in proteins
and vitamins. Through the structures of WFP and the DPRK Government, annually 1.3 million
children as well as pregnant and lactating mothers are guaranteed one balanced meal a day.
•

Italian Development Cooperation Office

•

French Cooperation Bureau

Non-Resident International NGOs
•

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)

•

Agape International

•

Chosun Exchange
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•

Christian Friends of Korea (CFK)

•

Gesellschaft für Nachhaltige Entwicklung (Association for Sustainable Development)

(GNE)
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•

Global Resource Services (GRS)

•

Korea Maranatha Foundation (KMF)

•

Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)

•

Mercy Corps

•

Mission East

•

Samaritan’s Purse

•

World Vision

Non-Resident Inter-governmental
•

Centre for Agricultural Bioscience International (CABI)
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